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Land reform in South Africa and the colonial present 
 
 
 
This paper develops Derek Gregory’s concept of the ‘colonial present’ by demonstrating 
how the colonial present in rural South Africa in general and around land reform in 
particular has conditioned land reform outcomes. My development of the concept departs 
from Gregory’s in two key respects. I argue first that, by viewing it in relation to the 
geopolitics of capitalism, it can be applied to places beyond the immediate influence of 
U.S. military power; and, second, that social forces which might begin to undermine the 
colonial present should be examined. My empirical materials draw upon primary 
research on the emergence of government-sponsored partnerships between restitution 
beneficiaries and agribusinesses in northern Limpopo. I use the materials to argue that 
partnerships have emerged given white farmers’ near-monopoly on skills and the 
persistent power of traditional leaders, two features of South Africa’s colonial past 
whose importance today is suggestive of a colonial present. 
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Introduction 
Derek Gregory’s The Colonial Present (2004) is an analysis of war, terror, and violence in 
Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq. He uses a wide range of materials to argue that ‘the capacities 
that inhere within the colonial past are routinely reaffirmed and reactivated in the colonial 
present’ (p.7). Referring to some of the politics and geographical dimensions of land reform in 
South Africa, I suggest that land reform outcomes have been fundamentally affected by relations 
of a thoroughly colonial type. South Africa is conventionally viewed as a ‘postcolonial’ place; in 
contrast to that view, I call attention to the colonial present in South Africa. I argue that it has two 
dimensions: first, white farmers’ near-monopoly on technical and entrepreneurial agricultural 
skills; second, the persistent power of those traditional leaders whose capacity the apartheid 
regime tried to elevate for its own purposes. I draw upon a wide range of literature on South 
Africa as well as primary research conducted in northern Limpopo province to illustrate how the 
colonial present has been germane to the emergence of certain land reform outcomes – 
specifically, the government-sponsored emergence of partnerships between land reform 
beneficiaries and agribusinesses. My interest is on the way in which the government has grappled 
with, and struggled to overcome, enduring and reactivated colonial relations; my focus is on 
outcomes of South Africa’s colonial present, rather than the processes through which particular 
agents actively construct it. 
 
Understanding the colonial present 
Gregory focuses on how the U.S. and its allies pursue domination via discursive practices, 
binaries, concepts of ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’, narratives about territorial logics; in short, and 
drawing parallels with Said’s (1978) concept of Orientalism, via ‘imaginative geographies’. The 
U.S. constructs an ‘architecture of enmity’, which ‘turn[s] on the cultural construction of their 
opponents […] as outsiders’ (Gregory 2004: 28). Elaborate techniques have been deployed, such 
as a ‘cartographic performance’, which discursively justified the invasion of Afghanistan by 
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locating the diffuse Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. The enemy was thereby located in a 
constructed field of battle (pp. 49-56), even though, and as Ettlinger and Bosco (2004) have 
theorized, ‘networks such as Al-Qaeda are constituted by a socio-cultural fabric that is intangible 
and cannot be located at fixed coordinates for either bombing or surveillance’ (pp. 254-55). To 
talk of a colonial present, then, is not to suggest that the U.S. or Britain are actively establishing 
colonies in Iraq, even though their military presence entails seizing land and establishing bases. 
Rather, it is to highlight the endurance, persistence or reactivation of particular colonial-style 
relations, which Harris (2004) has stressed should be understood as encompassing violence, 
dispossession, occupation and subjugation (as understood, for example, by Fanon 1963) as well 
as discourses and knowledge(s) (as theorized by Said). 
Gregory’s point in all of this, at least as I understand it, is to emphasize the similarities 
and symmetries between the manner in which material and discursive power was practiced by, 
say, Britain or France in the late nineteenth century and by the U.S. today. It is to call attention to 
the endurance of colonial-style practices and relations. Although it is unclear whether Gregory 
intended the colonial present concept to be applied to other contexts, I want to demonstrate that it 
does have wider applicability. Towards achieving this goal, however, I argue it is necessary – and 
possible – to re-theorize why the colonial present exists.  
In a telling statement, Gregory argues that, ‘the war on terror is an attempt to establish a 
new global narrative in which the power to narrate is vested in a particular constellation of power 
and knowledge within the United States of America’ (p.16). There is a hint of state-centric 
thinking here; that is, Gregory leaves the reader with a sense that the colonial present is not only 
pursued by states in the midst of ‘realist’ geopolitics, but also that states and their geopolitical 
maneuvrings are the driving forces behind the existence of the colonial present. In Gregory’s 
view, places will only be caught up in a colonial present if they are experiencing colonial-style 
techniques of domination practiced by the U.S. state and its war machine.  
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Whereas Gregory tends to see the geopolitical maneuvrings of states behind the 
reaffirming and reactivating of colonial relations, I find David Harvey’s view of geopolitics 
(1985), imperialism (Harvey 2003) and neoliberalism (Harvey 2005) a useful alternative. 
Harvey’s focus is on the geopolitics of capitalism, not states per se. His focus is on the territorial 
battles entailed by the necessarily geographic character of accumulation. He stresses the central 
role played by the U.S. government but theorizes that the driving force behind neoliberalism, and 
by extension U.S. military activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, is a ‘political project to re-establish 
the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites’ (2005: 19; 
emphasis in original). The key element is accumulation. Thus, outcomes such as the invasion of 
Iraq are part of attempts by the U.S. elite to ‘redefine the global and domestic order to its own 
advantage’ (2005: 189).  
I want to suggest that embracing Harvey’s view of the driving forces behind U.S. military 
intervention makes it possible to re-imagine the geography of the colonial present. If colonial-
style relations and practices endure or are reactivated because they suit the political-economic 
demands of accumulation, rather than particular states, then it becomes possible to imagine the 
colonial present operating in places outside the so-called Middle East; that is, in places that play 
little, if any, role in the ‘war on [/of] terror’. As I demonstrate, the colonial present can be 
theorized as existing and operating in a place such as South Africa. In contrast to the prominence 
Gregory affords aspects such as the application of particular technologies or discursive practices 
of domination, I emphasize the material dimensions of colonial-style relations in the light of the 
accumulation process as it unfolds in a geographic context. My focus is on outcomes of South 
Africa’s land reform process.  
 
Land reform in South Africa 
A recurring theme in the recent geography literature involves questions of the unequal 
distribution of land, of social movements of the landless, of state- or market-led land reform 
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(Benjaminsen et al 2006; Bobrow-Strain 2004; Wolford 2003, 2005; Ramutsindela 2002). Such 
work by geographers reflects the social, economic and political significance of ‘land questions’ in 
various settings around the world. One such place is South Africa. It is in the midst of a land 
reform program intended to undo a racially skewed distribution of land: the country’s 45,000 or 
so white farmers owned 82.2m hectares (67 per cent) of South Africa’s land area in 1996 (Walker 
2006: 145). Land reform aims to redistribute 30 per cent of commercial (and almost entirely 
white-owned) agricultural land by 2014 (Kepe and Cousins 2000; Ntsebeza and Hall 2006). 
According to a recent estimate, around 3.5 million hectares (or four percent) of agricultural land 
had been redistributed by February 2005 (Hall 2006).i   
A key pillar of land reform is ‘restitution’, via which individuals or groups of people 
dispossessed of rights in land by racially discriminatory laws since 1913 can claim back particular 
pieces of land (see Hall 2003, 2004). The pace of delivery in restitution has been far from 
impressive, something which has attracted criticism from land reform advocates and analysts (e.g. 
Lahiff 2005). Further criticism might emerge as a response to how the government has begun to 
settle some high-profile restitution claims. In particular, some claims on highly developed 
agricultural land have been completed by forcing restitution beneficiaries to enter into 
partnerships with white-owned agribusinesses (Mayson 2003; Shaker 2003). Shaker (2003) 
examined the terms according to which a partnership took shape on a former homeland citrus 
estate, Zebediela. The farm was ‘restructured’ i.e. privatized, and then returned to its rightful 
owners, the Bjathladi land claims community. However, the government only agreed to return the 
land under a highly restrictive arrangement via which the Bjathladi beneficiaries would have to 
enter into agreement with a ‘strategic partner’, South African Farm Management (SAFM). The 
Zebediela arrangement, which hinted at the rising influence of agribusinesses within the domain 
of land reform, informed the government’s approach to restitution in Levubu, and area of 
approximately 10,000 hectares of sub-tropical land around the Luvuvhu River on the southern 
piedmont of the Soutpansberg Mountains (see Figure One).  Roughly 200 white farmers in 
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Levubu grow avocados, macadamia nuts, mangoes and bananas for domestic consumption and 
export. The government has settled restitution claims on Levubu and transferred title deeds to 
seven groups – formally, although tenuously, ‘communities’ – of beneficiaries constituted by 
descendants of close to 10,000 people forcibly removed from the area in the late 1930s by the 
whites-only South African government.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE ONE HERE] 
 
Although the Levubu beneficiaries will own the land, they will not have full control over 
how it will be used. Rather, the government has deemed that, for at least the next fifteen years, 
the beneficiaries must operate the land in partnership with white-owned agribusinesses with 
which they will form joint venture companies. The beneficiaries are not allowed to re-settle the 
land, nor use it as they see fit; the land will be formally theirs, they will receive a revenue stream 
from it, but the government is insisting that the land is managed in a way that it prefers; i.e., 
commercially and in partnership with experienced and white partners (Fraser 2007). The 
arrangement is uneven. The agribusiness partners could use some of their other businesses 
upstream or downstream of the actual farming operations either to supply the joint venture 
companies at above-market rates, or to sell outputs to their factories or marketing companies at 
below-market rates. Another concern is that the white-owned agribusinesses will be more 
interested in short rather than long-term gain and hence will be prone to discourage sufficient 
investment in the land. The onus will be on the beneficiaries to monitor the activities of their 
partners and to ensure that adequate investment occurs rather than a gradual deterioration in the 
quality of their land. My interest is in understanding why and how white-owned agribusinesses 
are beginning to occupy such a prominent position in South Africa’s land reform program.   
 
South Africa’s colonial past 
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South Africa’s colonial past is an inescapable context for the contemporary land question. 
European settlers backed up by whites-only governments seized vast areas of land from Africans 
before and subsequent to the landmark 1913 Natives’ Land Act, the historical cut-off point for 
claims for restitution of land rights. Some of that land was farmed by an emerging African 
peasantry producing for new markets associated with mining (Bundy 1979). Dispossession 
destroyed the emerging African peasantry. Others had their land taken and, compelled to pay 
taxes in cash, were forced to find wage labor in the mining sector (Callinicos 1987). Unlike in 
numerous other colonial settings, Africans dispossessed of land and thrust into wage labor in 
South Africa were largely prevented from settling permanently in the cities. Instead, the colonial 
state established an archipelago of ‘Native Reserves’ (later ‘Homelands’), totaling around thirteen 
percent of the land area by 1936, from which Africans migrated to the cities to work (Beinart 
2001). The whites-only state controlled Africans in the native reserves via a system of ‘imperial 
rule’ (Ashforth 1997). 
Following the election in 1948 of the Afrikaner nationalist party, the National Party, the 
apartheid-era South African polity then developed into a ‘bifurcated state’ (Mamdani 1996) in 
which traditional leaders – Mamdani’s (1996) ‘decentralised despots’ – in the Homeland areas 
were formally allocated far-reaching powers with respect to land, labor, and gender relations. The 
policies of ‘grand apartheid’ (Crais 2006: 721) pursued Africans’ subjection indirectly via 
traditional leaders. Thus, and as Ashforth (1997: 109) has noted, ‘when it has come to questions 
of maintaining “order” and dispensing coercion Chiefs have performed crucial roles, symbolic 
and practical: suppressing resistance while distributing scarce resources’. But the decentralization 
of power to intermediaries in the Homelands recognized only to a limited extent the sovereignty 
of traditional leaders within their ‘invented’ (Crais 2006) domains; the whites-only nation-state 
was the ‘supreme chief’ (Mamdani 1996: 101) in the reserves. Nevertheless, ‘Whether it was 
about attaining a plot of land, getting a work permit or an old-age pension, or obtaining access to 
justice, the chief had by legislation been made into the sole portal to government’ (Oomen 2005: 
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20). Establishing the Homeland areas entailed thousands of forced removals, through which as 
many as 3.5 million people were displaced and located in one Homeland area or another (Platzky 
and Walker 1985). Many claims for restitution in urban and rural areas refer to this period of 
dispossession. However, by no means all of the 14 million or so people (Walker 2003) still living 
in what are now the former homeland areas, and therefore still living under the influence of 
traditional leaders and their allies, are in line for restitution.  
One final dimension of South Africa’s colonial past to consider here is the fact that the 
pre- and apartheid-era South African polity promoted a whites-only commercial agricultural 
sector, the advancement of which was a major reason for dispossession and forced removals. 
South Africa’s white farmers were major beneficiaries of colonialism, not just because the sector 
developed on land seized from Africans: rather, and especially under apartheid governments, the 
state sought to develop agriculture according to a model in which large-scale farming would draw 
heavily on state subsidies, protectionist measures, and use cheap African labor (Bernstein 1996; 
Greenberg 2003).The model lurched into crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s as lending 
institutions leaned on the National Party to open its market and reduce subsidies. Consequently, 
South African agriculture underwent a process of deregulation, which was largely completed in 
1996 by the country’s first democratic government. As in other places in which agriculture has 
undergone deregulation, agribusinesses have been empowered in South Africa and, as I shall now 
begin to discuss in more detail, are now well-positioned to gain in a post-land reform 
environment.  
 
South Africa’s colonial present 
My interest is in explaining how a colonial present has affected land reform. The first dimension 
refers to white farmers’ near-monopoly on technical and entrepreneurial skills needed for 
commercial agriculture. Whites were the only legitimate commercial farmers under apartheid. 
Not surprisingly, historically disadvantaged groups often lack the technical, marketing, legal, or 
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financial skills needed to farm land commercially. Groups representing emerging (mostly 
African) farmers such as the National Emergent Red Meat Producers’ Organisation have 
identified skills shortages among their members as a major constraint to growth (Business Day, 
6th April 2006) and have called on the government to step up its efforts to attract young black 
people into agriculture (Business Day, 5th September 2005). Of course, the skills question in 
agriculture reflects a broader problem in South Africa. A skills shortage among South Africa’s 
historically disadvantaged population has caused problems for state departments, national and 
local government (Lodge 2005), as well as limiting growth in particular economic sectors, such as 
call centers (Benner 2006). There are multiple causes, including ‘Bantu’ education policies in the 
apartheid-era, under-resourced schools in the contemporary period, and an inadequate public and 
private sector skills training program. There are signs that the state is addressing the skills 
problem: a Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETA) program has begun to upgrade 
skills. However, it did not begin soon enough after 1994.  
Thus, in the absence of concerted efforts to address the problem, white farmers continue to enjoy 
a near-monopoly on technical and entrepreneurial agricultural skills. Features of the colonial past 
– in this case white farmers’ privileged position – endure into the present. 
A second dimension of the colonial present has to do with another group of actors whose 
power has endured from the colonial past into the present: traditional leaders, as they were during 
the colonial / apartheid era, remain powerful in South Africa, if not necessarily at the national 
level then certainly in numerous rural areas in which traditional leaders retain rights to administer 
land. Their continued influence over people’s lives is an irrefutable reality in the former 
homeland areas of South Africa. It is, moreover, an extraordinary outcome, a ‘constitutional 
contradiction’ (Rangan and Gilmartin 2002), that the post-apartheid polity protects the institution 
of traditional authority even though the democratic Bill of Rights enshrines governance by 
elected representatives (Ntsebeza 2003). Rather than tackling their power, recent legislation such 
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as the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment Act 2003 illustrates the 
extent to which the government has actually strengthened their position.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, given their extensive powers in the colonial and apartheid era, 
traditional leaders have become prominent actors in the land reform process. There is firm 
evidence in the literature (e.g. Claassens 2001; Cousins 2006; Hall 2003; Mathis 2007) that 
traditional leaders and / or their allies actively strive to ensure that (at the very least) land reform 
does not undermine their social status, or (perhaps more commonly) ensure they receive a 
significant share of the benefits. A necessary caveat here is that traditional leaders are by no 
means influential actors in all land reform cases; few would have been involved in the almost 
50,000 restitution claims for urban land, ‘often involving individual families’ (Hall 2003: 25).ii 
Equally, and as Deborah James (2005) has noted, there are other individuals within groups of 
land reform beneficiaries who seek out personal gains at the expense of others.  
Attention to restitution is particularly helpful when thinking about the power of 
traditional leaders. Some traditional leaders in some areas have actually been empowered by the 
design of the restitution program as well as by how the government has implemented it. In terms 
of design, the restitution program provides for ‘communities’ of claimants to seek restitution of 
land rights. Ruth Hall (2003: 16) claims this has ‘sparked struggles over rights to land’; work by 
Everingham and Jannecke (2006) substantiates Hall’s claim. At issue are the ways in which post-
restitution rights are defined, defended, or contested by leaders of Communal Property 
Associations, traditional leaders or other groups such as civic organizations. Given that many, if 
not all, traditional leaders believe that land under claim for restitution should be returned to them, 
it is hardly surprising that some traditional leaders have ‘contested the authority of elected 
trustees’ and ‘captured the benefits’ for themselves (Cousins 2006: 237). If the land is reverted 
back to communal tenure, then traditional leaders will have the power to allocate it as they see fit; 
a far-reaching power but not something that restitution is supposed to deliver.  
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Besides how restitution has been designed, its implementation has not ensured that the 
leaders of groups of land reform beneficiaries are democratically elected rather than constituted 
or appointed by traditional leaders. Limited resources would appear to be one cause of the state’s 
inadequate response to the challenge of ensuring that land reform does not benefit elite leaders, or 
that beneficiaries are equally represented in ‘community’ organizations. Properly ensuring that 
communities claiming land were democratically represented would have required officials to 
spend much more time engaging with all of the beneficiaries, for example by running workshops 
with them to encourage participation.  
But it is worth noting here that traditional leaders also occupy positions of power and 
influence because they have an edge over others by virtue of their involvement in the former 
homeland administrations. For example, of the five main leaders of one group of claimants in 
northern Limpopo that I researched in early 2005, three had worked for the former Venda 
homeland government. Those experiences required and provided a level of education and 
knowledge of bureaucratic procedures not shared by the majority of their fellow claimants, which 
helped in the leaders’ attempts to lead the restitution claim and  control what happens to any 
income from the land.  
Thus, in areas of South Africa in which traditional leaders or their allies exert their 
typically undemocratic influence, social life in nominally postcolonial South Africa is akin to a 
colonial present. The institution of traditional authority – something which was formalized and 
promoted in the colonial period – is still a central feature of social life for millions of South 
Africans.  
 
Accumulation and the colonial present in South Africa 
Why, then, has the government not eliminated hereditary traditional authority rule; and why has 
the skills shortage among historically disadvantaged groups not been sufficiently addressed? In 
short, why is there a colonial present in South Africa? I suggest that both dimensions of the 
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colonial present should be viewed in the light of South Africa’s position relative to the 
accumulation process, and understood on a world scale. To rehearse the arguments of numerous 
scholars writing about neoliberalism in South Africa (e.g. Bond 2000; Carmody 2002; Peet 2002), 
the South African government has pursued an array of neoliberal policies which seek to keep 
inflation in check and achieve a positive balance of payments. The objective of policies such as 
water privatization, deregulation, ‘efficiency drives’ and restructuring of state assets is to 
(re)create the conditions for accumulation and secure a more advantageous position for South 
Africa in the international division of labor. The disciplining force of meeting inflation targets 
helps to explain why the government has been reluctant to borrow and then heavily invest in 
upgrading skills. Furthermore, neoliberalism is germane to understanding other dimensions of 
white farmers’ privileged position. The government agreed in the early 1990s to pursue land 
reform along the lines of a neoliberal-style model. Thus, and reflecting various tensions and 
social forces in the early 1990s – such as the central position of white farmers in the Afrikaner 
national imaginary, World Bank advice to the African National Congress (ANC) during 
negotiations to end apartheid, and the ANC’s determination to establish a cross-class alliance 
with South African capital – the ANC committed itself to a ‘willing-seller, willing-buyer 
principle’, which means land can only be acquired from landowners who agree to sell (Walker 
2005). South Africa’s ‘market fundamentalism’ (Lahiff 2005: 4) in this regard reflects neoliberal 
approaches to land reform in other places (Bobrow-Strain 2004; Borras 2003; Moyo and Yeros 
2005). As Lahiff (2005) has noted, then, white farmers were effectively granted a ‘veto’ over land 
reform. Thus, although the first democratic Constitution provided for land reform, it protected the 
existing landowners; it has, indeed, a strongly colonial character. The Constitution may have 
transformed formal political rights but it protected the property rights of white beneficiaries of 
colonialism, including white farmers. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it appears that the main 
beneficiaries of the state’s neoliberal turn have been those who already enjoyed material 
privileges, that is, capital in general and the country’s middle class whites: although there have 
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been some new, high-profile black entrants to the capitalist class, economic power remains 
largely concentrated among whites. A consequence of the South African government’s neoliberal 
stance and the Constitution, therefore, is that the degree of social and material change has not 
been too transformative.  
It should be noted here that neither the government’s inattention to the question of skills 
nor the white farmers’ veto over land reform would matter as much if the government was not so 
intent on ensuring that redistributed land is used for commercial purposes. As Gillian Hart (2002) 
has argued, for example, land reform could have followed the example of some East Asian 
countries by delivering land for subsistence purposes to the working class to supplement low 
wages. However, in the development of its current (revised) redistribution program, Land 
Redistribution for Agricultural Development, and in its approach to settling restitution claims, the 
government has stressed that redistributed land should be used for commercial, rather than 
subsistence, purposes (Jacobs et al 2003). The outcome of the government’s stance with respect 
to skills and its emphasis on commercial agriculture is a heavy reliance on white farmers.  
With regards to the position of traditional leaders, it is far from clear why the government 
is ‘casting its weight’ with them (Crais 2006: 735). Ntsebeza (2003) suggests that the ANC’s 
urban bias, its pragmatic outlook, and ‘broad-based organisation, with a diversity of opinions’ 
combine in such a way that the ANC is ‘under no pressure to resolve the issue of democracy in 
rural areas’ (p.76). Others suggest that accumulation, class struggle, and South Africa’s position 
relative to the geopolitics of capitalism matter. Clifton Crais’ (2006: 734) hypothesis, for 
example, is that traditional leaders are a useful bulwark to protect the government from protests 
against its neoliberal stance and the slow pace of transformation. The dynamics and geopolitics of 
capitalism, which make it difficult – if not impossible – for the South African government to 
pursue anything other than a neoliberal path, become implicated in the persistent power of 
traditional leaders. In effect, traditional leaders occupy a similar, privileged position as a 
conservative force in the democratic state as they did during the colonial / apartheid era.  
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The colonial present and the Levubu partnership approach 
I now draw on some materials regarding the restitution of land rights in the Levubu area of 
Limpopo province, and with particular reference to the government’s decision to opt for 
partnerships, to bring to light how the colonial present affects restitution outcomes. As mentioned 
earlier, although the returned land could have been directly transferred, thereby allowing the 
beneficiaries to decide what should be done with it, this has not occurred. What, then, did the 
government see as the benefits of having partnerships take shape? 
Reflecting the skills problem, the first dimension of the colonial present, officials 
working with the Limpopo Land Claims Commission (and closely involved in the Levubu case) 
viewed partnerships as a way to deal with the beneficiaries’ lack of technical and entrepreneurial 
skills. Officials drew upon the experience of early restitution ‘failures’ (cases in which restitution 
beneficiaries failed to operate transferred land) elsewhere in Limpopo. The collapse of 
agricultural production at Mamathola, for example, drew attention to the risks of directly 
transferring the land and relying on public sector post-settlement support, the deficiencies or total 
absence of which ‘has led to serious problems’ (Hall 2003: 18). Although many of the 
beneficiaries in Levubu practice subsistence agriculture and some even operate commercial 
farms, the government was convinced that the beneficiaries’ aggregate technical and 
entrepreneurial skills were far removed from the range of skills (such as applying pesticides, 
buying supplies, managing export contracts, etc.) practiced by the white horticultural farmers in 
Levubu. Partnerships were therefore viewed by government officials as a way to deal with the 
skills problem.  
Crucially, the government’s determination to establish partnerships has played into the 
hands of some white farming interests for whom collaboration with the government and 
restitution beneficiaries via the partnership approach had a compelling logic. One group of white 
farmers in Levubu with investments up and downstream of farming was especially keen to enter 
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into agreements that would provide secure access to a supply of raw materials to their factories as 
well as a market for their tree nurseries (Fraser 2007). They will share any farm-based profits and 
pay the beneficiaries an annual lease. A skills transfer plan is also expected to equip some among 
the beneficiaries with the requisite technical and entrepreneurial skills to assume full control over 
the farms at the end of the lease period. The white partners will therefore have plenty of time over 
the fifteen-year period of the agreement to recoup earlier investments in juicing and nut-drying 
factories. By virtue of their knowledge and managerial status, moreover, they will be well 
positioned to take advantage of the beneficiaries. They will have expertise that they might use to 
deceive the beneficiaries, for example by suggesting that investments in replacing fruit trees are 
not needed. The relationship established in the partnership appears lop-sided. The beneficiaries 
may become heavily dependent on their white agribusiness partners.  
White farming interests have certainly played a role in the forging of partnerships; 
likewise, the government has been determined to see them emerge. But there also is evidence to 
suggest that traditional leaders played a role in moving the wider group of beneficiaries towards 
partnerships. Based on my research with one group of people claiming back their land in Levubu, 
I now want to suggest that traditional leaders have been instrumental in laying the ground for the 
partnership approach. At issue is the degree to which the beneficiaries acquiesced with the 
government’s partnership approach.  
The focus here is on the Ravele group of beneficiaries. Their ancestors were almost 
entirely dispossessed of land rights in what is now known as Levubu in 1938; ‘almost’, that is, 
because, although all of the people were forced to move from Levubu to Mauluma and other 
areas of what eventually became the Venda homeland, the traditional leader’s family retained 
access to some ancestral graves. In ‘compensation’ for removal from their land, those living in 
the Ravele area were forced to move to Beaconsfield, Baobab, and Mapila farms in the Nzhelele 
valley, 20km northwest of the old Mauluma. The ‘compensation’ farms were of inferior quality. 
For example, whereas the original Mauluma could expect a minimum of 1,000mm of annual 
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rainfall and had ample grazing and cultivable land, annual rainfall totals in the new Mauluma are 
half or less and the soil and grazing land are greatly inferior. According to those in (the new) 
Mauluma who can recall first arriving there, life was much harder. A member of the Ravele LCC 
described the change: 
 
Before we were moved, we had goats, sheep, cattle, even horses, but many died on the 
way here. We had no more horses after that. Stocks of mealie-meal and other possessions 
were lost…This [new] place is too dry, too hot…Many people passed away…It was very 
bitter for them. You know, we were told, “look how big is the farm we are giving you 
compared to your land now”. But the quality of the land was not as good. Living is too 
hard here. (Personal Interview with Respondent # 20, August 2004). 
 
The Ravele traditional leader, F.N. Ravele (1926-1999), who was a leading member of the 
‘independent’ Venda Homeland government (Lahiff 2000), led a claim for restitution of the 
Ravele land in 1998 under the terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994. He appointed 
some of his closest allies to leadership positions in the Ravele Land Claims Committee. These 
committee members – all of whom were men – have since been joined by allies of the present 
traditional leader, but they have retained significant influence over decision-making (Personal 
interviews with numerous members of Ravele Land Claims Committee, February-April 2005). 
Thus, the Ravele beneficiaries have been led by allies of the former and current traditional leader 
rather than a democratically-elected leadership. Few among the beneficiaries have had any 
opportunity to do anything about the restitution claim as the leadership has retained tight control 
over information and decision-making.  
I argue that the Ravele leaders have played a significant role in pushing for partnerships, 
particularly among their fellow Ravele beneficiaries. In particular, the leadership cultivated 
enthusiasm for and acquiescence towards partnerships. That the beneficiaries as a whole accepted 
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the partnership proposals, despite the obvious risks, therefore reflects the advice of an 
undemocratic leadership installed by one traditional leader and then sponsored by his son. A not 
insignificant factor playing into the leaders’ hands was that the registered beneficiaries were 
scattered throughout the former Venda homeland, which made attending meetings held in 
Mauluma difficult (see Figure Two). Also worth noting here is the large number of Ravele 
beneficiaries who have migrated from Mauluma to Gauteng to find work and who are therefore 
not around to stay involved in decision-making in Mauluma. In other words, contingent 
conditions allowed the traditional leaders to prevail. If there had been a stronger interest among 
the Ravele people in the restoration of the land as a material matter, then there might have been 
stronger demands for a more open decision-making process. I suggest that these conditions 
merged with the community form of restitution, played into the leadership’s hands, and helped 
move the beneficiaries towards accepting partnerships.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE TWO HERE] 
Conclusion: A stable colonial present? 
I have argued that crucial considerations in the emergence of partnerships in Levubu are the near-
monopoly on the technical and entrepreneurial skills appropriate to commercial farming which 
white farmers enjoy and the influence of traditional leaders in cultivating the beneficiaries’ 
acquiescence with the government’s partnership approach. The colonial present has affected land 
reform outcomes. The question I should like to address now is whether the colonial present is 
stable; that is, are there forces that might begin to undermine the colonial present in South Africa? 
Gregory’s view of the colonial present leaves one with a strong sense of its embeddedness in the 
politics of today, its necessity to the practices of U.S. power. There are few glimmers of hope in 
The Colonial Present, which is perhaps understandable given the nature of the material on 
detentions, air strikes, murder in Baghdad, or occupation in Gaza with which he dealt. I suggest 
an alternative imaginary is needed for the colonial present concept to remain in the human 
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geography lexicon. A more hopeful view of the future is integral to Doreen Massey’s (2005) 
conceptualization of space. Like Gregory, Massey bases her understanding of time and space on a 
non-teleological view of the future, which in turn relies on accepting the possibility of 
heterogeneity and difference (literally) making a difference – but which also anticipates 
unexpected, or open, futures. In the spirit of anticipating openness, it is worth asking whether the 
colonial present will endure.  
With regards to addressing the skills question in South Africa, a response might be for the 
state to intervene more heavily than it has hitherto. Indeed, in a recent discussion of the South 
African state, Bill Freund (2006) has suggested that the prospect for a developmental state to 
emerge in South Africa rests on ‘overcoming its historic backwardness in terms of education and 
skills’ (p.6). Unwrapping the colonial present with respect to skills in agriculture and setting the 
scene for a more just transformation in agrarian relations depends to a great extent on 
approaching the skills issue with fresh ideas. A major government push is needed to reduce white 
farmers’ monopoly of skills suitable for commercial agriculture. Perhaps a more extensive and 
radical training program than the government’s current Sector Education and Training Authorities 
will begin to emerge. In the absence of such a push, however, it seems likely that the 
government’s ambitions for what land reform can achieve will continue to rely on white farmers, 
or at least on mostly white-owned agribusinesses and on their own particular agenda.  
With respect to traditional leaders and their allies, my conclusion is that they have been 
empowered by the way restitution has occurred in Levubu. The leaders of the Ravele 
‘community’ were appointed by the former traditional leader and are now politically close to the 
current traditional leader. The signs from Mauluma indicate that the Ravele leadership will tightly 
control the purse strings when revenue from the land begins to flow. Restitution is unlikely to de-
stabilize the colonial present unless, that is, the beneficiaries take control of the Communal 
Property Association formed in their name and use income from the land to achieve greater 
financial security and, hence, more independence from the traditional authorities in Mauluma. 
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Such a turnabout might be the only way for the ‘subjects’ in Mauluma to reduce the influence of 
traditional leaders and autocratic decision-making more generally. I sensed some determination 
among some people in Mauluma to make such a move, but not from many.  
A final issue here connects with both the skills question and the fate of traditional 
authority. Even if a skills program in the agricultural sector was advanced, there is evidence that 
(young) Africans’ interest in farming the land is dwindling, as Cherryl Walker (2006: 148-9) has 
discussed. Walker found that young people were reluctant to move from the urban amenities and 
services in the town of Ladysmith to work on an agricultural project on restituted land in Cremin, 
KwaZulu-Natal. The reluctance to work in agriculture reflects a broader problem for a land 
reform program oriented towards commercial agriculture: wages in agriculture cannot compete 
with the non-agricultural labor market. New policies such as Black Economic Empowerment, via 
which the government intends the economy to draw skilled black people into the upper ranks of 
the division of labor (Iheduru 2004), compound the problem. One white farmer in northern 
Limpopo pointed out the challenge: 
 
There’s excellent, excellent people that could do it, that could be trained up. But 
the market will pull them into wherever they can earn the most. And that won’t be 
agriculture. Not now. Maybe one day, but not now. It will not. It will not pull them 
in. It’s just not there. Why would a guy who can earn R½m [Approx. £35 000] a 
year go and work for R50 000 a year? He’d be stupid. (Personal interview,  
October 2004).  
 
Clearly, then, the colonial present will endure if white farmers’ monopoly on skills is not diluted. 
But the question of agriculture’s appeal cannot be divorced from the pull of the ‘urban’ in areas to 
which African urbanization was historically displaced. The former homeland areas have urban-
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level population densities and, via migration, strong social connections with South Africa’s cities. 
What they lack are urban-type services and jobs.  
My research in Mauluma found similar circumstances to Walker’s research in Cremin. 
Few beneficiaries in Mauluma expressed an interest in permanently moving back to Levubu to 
live or to farm. In contrast, say, to restitution claims referring to forced removals during the 1960s 
and 1970s, the length of time since their removal in 1938 has meant that the Ravele restitution 
beneficiaries have adjusted to life in Mauluma: Mauluma has electricity and most houses are 
connected to the water supply; and there are social networks of kin and church that would be 
broken if the beneficiaries moved back to the land. Just as Paula Meth (2001) found in her work 
on life in Bilanyoni, KwaZulu-Natal, Mauluma has become ‘home’; only the very old had any 
memory of the life they were removed from in Levubu. The beneficiaries’ attachment to 
Mauluma connects with their interest in seeing income from the returned land used to ‘develop’ 
Mauluma, that is, to make it more of a town rather than a village; a place with work, roads, shops, 
clinics. For example, one respondent said, ‘I would like a shopping complex. A Spar [shop] 
perhaps’ (Interview with Respondent # 13, March 2005). Others said: 
 
‘We should develop the schools, improve the standard of the streets, and to tar the 
road’ (Interview with Respondent # 2, March 2005) 
 
‘It [the money] should be used to develop Mauluma: schools, the clinic, streets and 
roads’ (Interview with Respondent # 9, March 2005) 
 
‘The money can be used for community development: proper roads and streets’ 
(Interview with Respondent # 6, March 2005). 
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‘The priority is roads, a sports facility, a gymnasium and then schools’ (Interview 
with Respondent # 15, March 2005). 
 
Interest in jobs and services of an urban-type confirmed the declining interest in farming noted by 
one woman in Mauluma:  
  
‘Look at the new generation. How many are doing farming? There is no interest in 
farming among the young people. Few, very few are interested. There is an 
irrigation scheme here [in Mauluma] but how many young people are there?’ 
(Interview with Respondent # 9, March 2005). 
 
The partnerships operating the Ravele land in Levubu should generate a decent revenue 
stream but it is unlikely to be enough to transform Mauluma into a town with urban-type services 
and jobs. Mauluma in unlikely to depart from other areas within the former homelands: it seems 
likely that the absence of services and jobs will continue to propel young people to drift towards 
nearby towns or to the main cities. The outcome of this is that the colonial present will be 
experienced unevenly: wage employment reduces migrants’ material link and dependence upon 
traditional leaders but without a radical transformation in the government’s stance towards 
traditional leaders, it will be those who are left behind who will continue to live with autocracy, 
patriarchy, and even (in some cases) despotism; that is, their colonial present will persist.  
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Captions 
Figure One: The northern area of Limpopo Province. 
Figure Two: The geographic distribution of Ravele restitution beneficiaries  
(Figure Two Source: List of registered Ravele beneficiaries, Ravele Land Claims Committee). 
 
                                                 
i
 ENDNOTES 
 
  Much more land will have to be redistributed in the next few years to meet the 
government’s target. But the experience of restitution (which was supposed to be 
completed by 2006 but which is currently intended to end by 2008) suggests that the 
government is relatively content to move the goal posts when it sees fit. 
 
ii  It also would be a mistake to claim that traditional leaders are always a negative 
influence; negative, that is, in the sense of undermining elected trustees or seeking to 
secure a disproportionate share of the benefits from restitution. The institution of 
traditional leadership undoubtedly tends towards denying women their full rights as 
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, but project workers in a non-governmental organisation 
in northern Limpopo drew my attention to one case in which traditional leaders had 
protected a woman’s rights to land after her husband had died and despite his family 
demanding that she leave his house. 
 
